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We show that real multiplex networks are unexpectedly robust against targeted attacks on high
degree nodes, and that hidden interlayer geometric correlations predict this robustness. Without
geometric correlations, multiplexes exhibit an abrupt breakdown of mutual connectivity, even with
interlayer degree correlations. With geometric correlations, we instead observe a multistep cascading
process leading into a continuous transition, which apparently becomes fully continuous in the
thermodynamic limit. Our results are important for the design of efficient protection strategies and
of robust interacting networks in many domains.
Networks are ubiquitous in many domains of science
and engineering, ranging from ecology to economics, and
often form critical infrastructures, like the Internet and
financial systems. Nowadays, these systems are increas-
ingly interdependent [1] and form so-called multiplex or
multilayer networks [2, 3]. This interdependency implies
that, if a node fails in one network layer, its counterparts
in the other layers also fail simultaneously. This process
can continue back and forth between the layers, which
makes them especially vulnerable to failures. In particu-
lar, an abrupt transition can arise in mutual percolation
when nodes are removed at random [3–5]. Interestingly,
interlayer degree correlations [6–9] mitigate this vulner-
ability to random node removals and the transition be-
comes continuous [10, 11].
In real systems, failures may not always be random
but, instead, the result of targeted attacks. Multi-
plexes are extremely vulnerable to them on high-degree
nodes [12–14], and exhibit a discontinuous phase tran-
sition even in the presence of interlayer degree correla-
tions [13]. Although it is highly important for many real
systems, it is not well understood how this vulnerabil-
ity can be mitigated. Previous results point to negative
interlayer degree correlations as a mitigation factor [13],
but real systems tend to show positive instead of nega-
tive interlayer degree correlations [6]. Are there other
structural features that render multiplex networks ro-
bust against targeted attacks? And most importantly,
are these properties present in real multiplexes?
Here, we show that interlayer hidden geometric cor-
relations [15] mitigate the vulnerability of multiplexes
to targeted attacks. The removal of the highest degree
nodes triggers multiple cascades which do not destroy
the system completely, but eventually lead into a contin-
uous percolation transition. Strikingly, we show that the
strength of these geometric correlations in real systems
is a good predictor of their robustness.
More specifically, we consider targeted attacks in two-
layer multiplexes, where nodes are removed in decreas-
ing order of their degrees among both layers. We rank
all nodes i according to Ki = max(k
(1)
i , k
(2)
i ), where k
(j)
i
denotes the degree of node i in layer j = 1, 2. We remove
nodes with higher Ki first (we undo ties at random) and
re-evaluate all Kis after each removal. To measure the
percolation state of the multiplex, we compute its mutu-
ally connected component (MCC) as the largest fraction
of nodes that are connected by a path in every layer using
only nodes in the component [4].
Figure 1 shows results for the real arXiv collabora-
tion [16], C. Elegans [17], Drosophila [18], and Sacc
Pomb [18] (see Table I, SM Section I, and Supplementary
Videos I-IV) as well as for their reshuffled counterparts
(an illustration of a targeted attack sequence is shown in
Fig. 2a-d). To create the reshuffled counterpart, we ran-
domly reshuffled the translayer node-to-node mappings
by selecting one of the layers and randomly interchanging
the internal IDs of the nodes in that layer. This process
destroys all correlations between the layers without al-
tering the layers’ topologies (see SM Section I for further
details). We quantify the vulnerability of the real and
reshuffled multiplexes by calculating the critical number
of nodes, ∆N . The removal of this critical number re-
duces the size of the MCC from more than aM to less
than Mβ , where M is the initial size of the MCC before
any nodes are removed, a ≤ 1 is a threshold parameter,
and β < 1 [19]. We set a = 0.4, β = 0.5. The larger
the ∆N , the more robust (less vulnerable) the system is.
For the real arXiv multiplex we find that ∆N ≈ 25, while
for its reshuffled counterpart ∆Nrs = 1. In fact, in the
reshuffled system, the removal of a single node reduces
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Figure 1. (a) Relative size of the mutually connected com-
ponent (MCC) against the fraction p of nodes remaining in
the system for the arXiv (layers 1, 2) collaboration multiplex
(green lines) and for its reshuffled counterpart (red dashed
lines). Different lines correspond to different realizations of
the targeted attacks process. (b) shows the same for the C.
Elegans multiplex (layers 2 and 3), (c) for Drosophila (layers
1 and 2), and (d) for Sacc Pomb (layers 3 and 4).
the relative size of the MCC from 73% to only 0.25%.
This is far more pronounced than the limits of a = 40%
and
√
M/M = 3.6%, and is enough to virtually discon-
nect this system. We have considered other layer pairs of
the arXiv, as well as a large number of other real multi-
plexes from different domains (technological, social, and
biological). We found that in the vast majority of cases,
the real system is significantly more robust against tar-
geted attacks than its reshuffled counterpart (see Table I
and SM Sections I, II).
Below, we show that this increased robustness of real
multiplexes to targeted attacks is due to hidden geomet-
ric correlations interwoven in their layers [15], which do
not exist in their reshuffled counterparts. Specifically,
each single network layer can be mapped (or embed-
ded) into a separate hyperbolic space [20–22], where each
node i is represented by its radial (popularity) and angu-
lar (similarity) coordinates, ri, θi, which are both signifi-
cantly correlated in different layers, while hyperbolically
closer nodes in each layer are connected with higher prob-
ability (see SM Section I for further details).
Radial correlations are equivalent to interlayer degree
correlations [23]. Angular correlations, instead, lead to
sets of nodes that are similar—close in the angular sim-
ilarity space—in each layer of the multiplex [15]. The
reshuffling process explained earlier destroys both radial
Dataset MCC ∆N ∆Nrs NMI
arXiv Layers 1, 2 790 25.2 1.0 0.58
Physicians Layers 1, 2 104 6.0 1.0 0.41
Internet Layer 1, 2 4710 81.4 14.1 0.34
C. Elegans Layers 2, 3 257 14.0 1.1 0.34
SacchPomb Layers 3, 4 426 4.2 1.5 0.17
Drosophila Layers 1, 2 449 8.4 2.0 0.26
Brain Layers 1, 2 74 7.0 1.0 0.19
Rattus Layers 1, 2 158 4.0 1.0 0.18
Air/Train Layers 1, 2 67 3.0 3.0 0.10
Table I. Analyzed datasets for selected layer pairs (see SM
Section I for all layer pairs). MCC denotes the initial size of
the MCC, ∆N denotes the critical number of nodes whose
removal reduces the MCC from 40% to
√
M/M (in relative
size), and ∆Nrs the same for the reshuffled system. Values
are averages over 100 realizations of the removal process. NMI
denotes the normalized mutual information (see SM Section
IX) and gives a measure of the strength of angular correlations
between the layers of the considered real systems.
and angular correlations between the layers. The extreme
vulnerability of the reshuffled counterparts in comparison
to the real systems raises fundamental questions: Are
the radial (i.e., interlayer degree) correlations, or angu-
lar (i.e., geometric) correlations, or both, responsible for
the robustness of real systems, and which of these corre-
lations can help to avoid catastrophic cascading failure
when multiplexes are under targeted attack?
To investigate these questions, we use the geometric
multiplex model (GMM) (see SM Section III) to generate
synthetic two-layer multiplexes, which resemble the real
equivalents. The model produces multiplexes with layers
embedded into hyperbolic planes, whereby the strength
of interlayer correlations between the radial and angular
coordinates of nodes that simultaneously exist in both
layers can be tuned by varying the model parameters
ν ∈ [0, 1] and g ∈ [0, 1]. Radial correlations increase with
parameter ν (ν = 0 for no radial correlations, whereas
ν = 1 for maximal radial correlations). Similarly, angu-
lar correlations increase with parameter g (g = 0 for no
angular correlations, while g = 1 for maximal angular
correlations).
We find that synthetic multiplexes without angular
correlations exhibit an extreme vulnerability to targeted
attacks (see Fig. 2e, SM Section III, and Supplementary
Video V), similarly to the reshuffled counterparts of real
systems (cf. Fig. 1 and SM Section II). In particular,
if the multiplex is sufficiently large, then the removal of
only a single node can reduce the size of the MCC from
40% to the square root of its initial size, thus destroying
the connectivity of the system, see Fig. 2f. The abrupt
character of the transition is also reflected in the distri-
bution of mutually connected component sizes. In the
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Figure 2. Targeted attacks on synthetic multiplex networks generated by the GMM model (see text). Each layer has power law
degree distribution with exponent γ = 2.6, average node degree 〈k〉 ≈ 6, and clustering c¯ = 0.35. (a-d) Here, each layer has
N = 500 nodes, and we have set g = 1 and ν = 0. (a) relative size of the MCC as a function of the fraction of nodes remaining
in the system p. (b) MCC after the removal of 4 nodes (corresponding to the dashed blue line in (a)). (c) the same as in (b)
after the removal of 23 nodes (dashed red line in (a)). (d) the MCC after the removal of 42 nodes (dashed yellow line in (a)).
(e) Evolution of the MCC in a two-layer synthetic multiplex with layers of size N = 2× 103 nodes. The inset shows the same
for 106 nodes. (f) critical number of nodes, ∆N , as a function of the system size N when there are no angular correlations,
g = 0, and for different radial correlation strengths. The results are averages over 60 realizations (for N < 10000 we performed
1000 realizations). (g) the same as in (f) but for different values of the angular correlations strength g and for fixed ν = 1. (h)
shows the largest and second largest cascade size (relative to system size).
fragmented phase, the entire network is always split into
very small components, even when the system is very
close to the transition (see Fig. 3a and SM Section IV).
In the percolated phase, only nodes that do not belong to
the MCC remain fragmented into small components (see
Fig. 3b and SM Section IV). This behavior is not affected
by the strength of the radial (i.e., interlayer degree) corre-
lations in the system. Thus, in contrast to the mitigation
effect for random failures, interlayer degree correlations
do not avoid an abrupt transition in the case of targeted
attacks, and essentially do not affect the robustness of
the system.
On the other hand, this extreme vulnerability is mit-
igated if angular correlations are present. In Fig. 2a-d
and e, we show the MCC percolation transition for max-
imal angular correlations (see also SM Sections II, III,
and Supplementary Video V). We observe that the tran-
sition does indeed start with a multistep cascading pro-
cess for relatively small system sizes. However, as shown
in Fig. 2f and Fig. 2g, the critical number of nodes, ∆N ,
scales with the system size in the presence of angular
correlations, see also SM Section V, while it always con-
verges to one for large system sizes if angular correla-
tions are absent. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 2h, the
relative size of the largest jump after a single node re-
moval decreases with the system size, in stark contrast
to the case without angular correlations, where this quan-
tity becomes size independent. This suggests that, in the
thermodynamic limit, the system undergoes a continuous
transition (see inset in Fig. 2e). Furthermore, the size of
the second largest component scales with the system size
likeNσ, with σ ≈ 0.84 (see Fig. 3d, e and SM Section VI).
Finally, at the transition, the distribution of component
sizes follows a power-law (see Fig. 3c and SM Section IV).
Thus, we conjecture that angular correlations can lead to
a multistep cascading process for relatively small system
sizes, and can give rise to a continuous transition in the
thermodynamic limit (happening in a range of parame-
ters of the model—including those used in Fig. 2—such
that the multiplex layers have strong metric structure but
do not loose the small-world property in the targeted at-
tack process, see SM Section VII). This behavior is not
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Figure 3. (a-c) shows the distribution of component sizes
(PDF) during the evolution of the MCC for two-layer syn-
thetic multiplexes constructed with the GMM model. Each
layer has a power law degree distribution with exponent
γ = 2.6, average node degree 〈k〉 = 6, and clustering c¯ = 0.35.
In (a-c) each layer has N = 5×104 nodes. (a) distribution of
component sizes directly before the transition (p = 0.94539),
and (b) directly after (p = 0.94540), when there are no radial
or angular correlations, ν = 0, g = 0. (c) distribution of com-
ponent sizes at p = 0.9078 when there are maximal angular
correlations, g = 1, and no radial correlations, ν = 0. (d)
absolute size of the second largest MCC as a function of p for
different layer sizes N as indicated in the legend (×103); for
each size, the results are averages over 60 realizations of the
multiplex (as in (e)). (e) scaling of the maximum of the sec-
ond largest MCC. The black dashed line shows a fit ∝ N0.84,
while the inset shows the value of p = pc where the maximum
is realized.
affected by the strength of radial (i.e., interlayer degree)
correlations and cannot be explained by the link overlap
induced by geometric correlations (see SM Section VIII).
Taken together, our results suggest that angular (similar-
ity) correlations can mitigate the extreme vulnerability
of real multiplexes against targeted attacks.
We can validate this conclusion in real systems. To
this end, we compare the vulnerability of each of the
considered real multiplexes (see Table I and SM Section
I) with that of its reshuffled counterpart. We define the
relative mitigation of vulnerability as
Ω =
∆N −∆Nrs
∆N + ∆Nrs
, (1)
where ∆N and ∆Nrs are the number of nodes needed for
the critical reduction of the size of the MCC of the real
and reshuffled systems, see Table I and SM Section I. Ω is
a measure of how much more resilient the real networks
are compared to their reshuffled counterparts. Next, we
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Figure 4. Relative mitigation of vulnerability Ω (Eq. (1)) as a
function of the normalized mutual information NMI, which
is a measure of the strength of angular correlations between
the layers of the considered real systems (see SM Section IX
for details).
study how Ω behaves as a function of the strength of
angular correlations in the considered real systems. We
quantify the strength of interlayer angular correlations
by calculating the normalized mutual information, NMI,
between the inferred angular coordinates of nodes in dif-
ferent layers (see SM Section IX). A larger NMI means
higher angular correlations. We find a strong positive
correlation (ρ ≈ 0.6) between the strength of angular
correlations in the real systems and their relative miti-
gation of vulnerability, see Fig. 4. This finding validates
our previous arguments with real data, and highlights the
importance of angular correlations in making real multi-
plexes robust against targeted attacks.
The gain of robustness due to angular correlations can
be understood intuitively by the formation of macro-
scopic mutually connected structures on the periphery
of the hyperbolic disc in each layer. After enough nodes
are removed, the remaining multiplex resembles a “dou-
ble ring” (Fig. 2c), because the higher degree nodes
which have been removed had lower radial coordinates
and hence were closer to the center of the disc. If an-
gular correlations are present, the remaining lower de-
gree nodes that are close in one layer tend to also be
close in the other layer. As a consequence, the double
ring contains macroscopic mutually connected structures
(Fig. 2d) that sustain connectivity in the system. Notice
that the mitigation of the extreme vulnerability of multi-
plexes by the effect of angular correlations is directly re-
lated to their geometric nature and cannot be explained
by any topological feature. To support this point, we
checked whether interlayer clustering correlations (being
clustering the topological feature which is more directly
related to the metric properties of networks [24]) or edge
overlap induced by geometric correlations are sufficient to
produce the mitigation effect. The results, see SM Sec-
tions VIII and X, indicate that in the absence of angular
correlations, neither clustering correlations nor overlap
can explain the observed mitigation effect. We take this
5to be a new validation of the geometric nature of com-
plex networks and of the role of geometric correlations in
multiplexes.
To conclude, we have shown that the strength of geo-
metric (similarity) correlations in real multiplex networks
is a good predictor for their robustness against targeted
attacks, providing, for the first time, strong empirical
evidence for the relevance of this mechanism in real sys-
tems. Using a geometric multiplex network model, we
have shown that multiplex networks are extremely vul-
nerable against targeted attacks, exhibiting a discontin-
uous phase transition if geometric (similarity) correla-
tions are absent. Contrarily, the presence of such corre-
lations mitigates this vulnerability significantly, inducing
a multistep cascading process in relatively small systems
which does not destroy the system completely but lead
into an eventually smooth percolation transition, with
results suggesting that it can be fully continuous in the
thermodynamic limit. In particular, the critical number
of nodes that has to be removed to disconnect the system
scales with the system size only if geometric correlations
are present. Our results can help when designing efficient
protection strategies and more robust and controllable in-
terdependent systems. In addition, the results highlight
that dependent networks without similarity correlations
are extremely vulnerable to targeted attacks. Finally,
our findings pave the way for an exact analysis of the
percolation properties of such systems via their hidden
geometric spaces.
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